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Strategyproofness

In: Fair Queueing

Author

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  • Youngsub Chun

    (Seoul National University)

Abstract

Strategyproofness requires that an agent should not have an incentive to misrepresent her waiting cost no matter what she believes other agents to be doing. We investigate its implications in the context of queueing problems. We begin with the classic result of Holmström (Econometrica 47:1137–1144, 1979) which implies in our context that a rule satisfies queue-efficiency and strategyproofness if and only if it is a VCG rule. By additionally imposing equal treatment of equals, we characterize the complete family of anonymous VCG rules. The symmetrically balanced VCG rule is the only member of this family satisfying budget balance. On the other hand, by imposing independence axioms, the pivotal and the reward-based pivotal rules (Mitra and Mutuswami, Games Econ Behav 72:242–254, 2011) can be characterized. We also characterize the class of k-pivotal rules by generalizing the independence axioms.

Suggested Citation

  • Youngsub Chun, 2016. "Strategyproofness," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Fair Queueing, chapter 0, pages 61-78, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-319-33771-5_6
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5_6
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    Cited by:

    1. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2014. "Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 425-442, June.
    2. Conan Mukherjee, 2014. "Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 289-311, February.

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