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Egalitarian Collective Decisions as ‘Good’ Corporate Governance?

In: Advances in Collective Decision Making

Author

Listed:
  • Federica Alberti

    (University of Portsmouth)

  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

  • Hartmut Kliemt

    (Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen)

  • Kei Tsutsui

    (University of Bath)

Abstract

Value-neutral (Robbinsian) economic science cannot directly address substantive normative issues. Economics can, however, provide analytical and empirical methods that make implications and consequences of normative premises (more) transparent and thereby indirectly contribute to normative opinion formation. To this effect, we translate substantive normative premises of stakeholder value approaches into operational axioms that characterize a class of collective decision mechanisms. If such implications seem less attractive to stakeholder theorists than the high-minded values from which they started in criticism of shareholder value approaches, they should come up with alternative collective decision mechanisms or a modified set of values.

Suggested Citation

  • Federica Alberti & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Kei Tsutsui, 2023. "Egalitarian Collective Decisions as ‘Good’ Corporate Governance?," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Alexander Mayer (ed.), Advances in Collective Decision Making, pages 173-188, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-031-21696-1_11
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_11
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