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Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Road Pricing Games: State of the Art and Future Research

In: Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security

Author

Listed:
  • Kateřina Staňková

    (Maastricht University)

  • Alexander Boudewijn

    (Maastricht University)

Abstract

Optimal toll design deals with the problem of determining toll which improves performance of a road traffic system. Noncooperative game theory is an excellent tool to investigate possible strategies to analyze such a problem, in which one has to take drivers’ reaction to toll and consequent changes in the traffic flow into account. Depending on the toll structure, the problem may be formulated as a Stackelberg game (when toll is uniform or time-varying) or as an inverse Stackelberg game (when toll is traffic-flow dependent), with the road authority as the leader and drivers as followers. While the inverse Stackelberg approach is more complex to adopt, it has been shown in our previous work that in most situations it brings better outcome for the road authority. This chapter reviews existing results on this topic, discusses our recent case studies within this framework, develops new properties, and brings forward the open issues within this area.

Suggested Citation

  • Kateřina Staňková & Alexander Boudewijn, 2015. "Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Road Pricing Games: State of the Art and Future Research," Springer Series in Reliability Engineering, in: Kjell Hausken & Jun Zhuang (ed.), Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security, edition 127, pages 191-209, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ssrchp:978-3-319-11674-7_8
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-11674-7_8
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