IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/sptchp/978-981-95-4302-1_7.html

Auctions and Mechanisms

In: A Case-Based Approach to Game Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Rohit Prasad

    (Management Development Institute Gurugaon, Economics and Public Policy)

Abstract

This chapter introduces mechanism design—the reverse engineering of games to achieve desired outcomes. It begins with a deep dive into auction theory, explaining how different formats (first-price, second-price, ascending-bid) elicit different bidding behaviours. Case studies include IPL player auctions, spectrum sales, and internet ad word markets. The model of all-pay auctions, where one bidder wins the object but every bidder foregoes their entire bid amount, is used to explain the over-allocation of resources in electoral contests. The chapter also applies the same model in the winner-takes-all industries of the Internet to argue that the increase in social resources flowing to such industries and the cosy handshake between such industries and elected representatives explain the rapid increase in the money expended in elections. It ends with a discussion of matching mechanisms, especially the Gale–Shapley algorithm, and how they could revolutionize future labour markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Rohit Prasad, 2026. "Auctions and Mechanisms," Springer Texts in Business and Economics, in: A Case-Based Approach to Game Theory, chapter 7, pages 211-235, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-981-95-4302-1_7
    DOI: 10.1007/978-981-95-4302-1_7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-981-95-4302-1_7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.