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On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly

In: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games

Author

Listed:
  • Ferenc Szidarovszky

    (University of Pécs)

  • Akio Matsumoto

Abstract

A modified Cournot oligopoly is introduced and examined in which the firms can treat their wastes up to a certain amount, and if the amount of waste is even higher then an outside facility is used with a given fixed cost and higher unit cost. The resulting payoff functions become discontinuous. The best response functions of firms are nonincreasing and also might be discontinuous. The best response functions can be modified to depend on the total industry output, which also might be discontinuous as well as multiple valued. The existence of at least one equilibrium is proved and numerical examples show the possibility of a unique equilibrium as well as that of multiple equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Ferenc Szidarovszky & Akio Matsumoto, 2016. "On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Pierre von Mouche & Federico Quartieri (ed.), Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games, pages 101-118, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-319-29254-0_8
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_8
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    Cited by:

    1. Lamantia, Fabio & Pezzino, Mario & Tramontana, Fabio, 2018. "Dynamic analysis of discontinuous best response with innovation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 120-133.
    2. Merlone, Ugo & Szidarovszky, Ferenc, 2022. "Cournot oligopoly when the competitors operate under capital constraints," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).

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