Author
Abstract
Corporate compliance was originally designed as an internal risk control mechanism aimed at addressing unlawful or improper conduct within enterprises. Over time, it has evolved into a core component of modern corporate governance. For an extended period, compliance either functioned as a means of self-regulation adopted voluntarily by enterprises to strengthen internal management or as a sector-specific tool of industry governance intended to promote self-monitoring and prevent destructive market competition. However, as enterprises have grown in scale, complexity, and specialization, traditional enforcement approaches—predicated on harsh punitive measures such as substantial fines, license revocations, and criminal penalties—have increasingly proven inadequate in addressing corporate misconduct. This is particularly evident in such areas as securities and futures, anti-unfair competition, anti-money laundering, and anti-commercial bribery. In these domains, administrative enforcement faces deeply entrenched and systemic challenges. Regulatory agencies often struggle to address the structural and cultural causes of widespread violations within large corporations. As a result, they frequently fail to detect or prevent structural illegality, and in some cases, even encounter regulatory failure. To enhance corporate supervision and compel enterprises to manage legal risks more effectively, governments across jurisdictions have gradually embraced the construction of compliance programs as a key strategy for regulatory oversight. Within administrative enforcement, this has led to the emergence of a dual-track model that combines traditional “deterrence-based” approaches with an “incentive-based” logic. Under this emerging model, regulators may offer leniency in exchange for demonstrable compliance efforts. For enterprises that establish effective compliance programs, regulators may refrain from initiating enforcement actions, consider the existence of a compliance framework as a mitigating factor in administrative penalties, or treat compliance commitments as a precondition for concluding an administrative settlement agreement. Through this process, compliance-based regulatory mechanisms have been progressively integrated into the administrative enforcement system in China.
Suggested Citation
Ruihua Chen, 2026.
"Administrative Settlements and Compliance Oversight,"
Springer Books, in: An Introduction to Corporate Compliance, chapter 0, pages 211-241,
Springer.
Handle:
RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-95-7257-1_7
DOI: 10.1007/978-981-95-7257-1_7
Download full text from publisher
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's
web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a
for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-95-7257-1_7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.