A Theoretical Analysis of the Formation and Essence of Bureaucratic Capital

“Bureaucratic capital” has rapidly become a public target since the end of the War of Resistance, yet discussion of it often oscillates between two errors: treating it as a mere tautology (“capital owned by bureaucrats”) or exaggerating its fluidity until it becomes elusive. I argue that bureaucratic capital is at once vivid and specific. It takes three basic forms: capital owned by bureaucrats, capital used by bureaucrats through public enterprises, and capital controlled by bureaucrats through their power over private business. These forms are distinct yet interdependent, and their interaction—made possible only by governmental authority under particular social conditions—constitutes the concrete content of bureaucratic capital. I then show that modern bureaucratic capital in China is closely tied to loan and banking capital, retaining strong usurious and political characteristics. Its operation tends toward monopolization and politicization of economic activity and, through its dependence on foreign forces, easily acquires a comprador stamp. Understanding these tendencies is indispensable for assessing its role and consequences in China’s economy.