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Equilibrium and Optimization to the Unequal Game of Capital-Labor Interest

In: The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

Author

Listed:
  • Ming-liang Wang

    (Guangdong University of Technology)

  • Yu Lu

    (Guangdong University of Technology)

Abstract

Imbalance of labor-capitals’ interests is the inevitable result of both employers and employees unequal game. Labor for the respect of the existing distribution system just because they have no better choice. The key to reverse the imbalance in the distribution of labor interests is to strengthen labor game ability. Formation of autonomous trade unions will increase the labor collective game capabilities, and specific training will help to expand the labor game resources to enhance the ability of the individual game; a sound social security system will help to ease the worries of the failure of labor negotiations, thus improve the labor’s tolerance to the time costs for labor-capital consultation, strengthen the credibility of labor “threat”. Meanwhile, the sound signal-transformation mechanism is helpful to build the reputation of incentives to stimulate corporate social responsibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Ming-liang Wang & Yu Lu, 2013. "Equilibrium and Optimization to the Unequal Game of Capital-Labor Interest," Springer Books, in: Ershi Qi & Jiang Shen & Runliang Dou (ed.), The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 1015-1021, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38391-5_107
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38391-5_107
    as

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