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The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Emergence of Cooperation

In: Social Media Marketing

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  • Eric Anderson

Abstract

John Nash’s concept of equilibrium demonstrates how games may have sub-optimal solutions that are nevertheless stable, because neither player can improve their condition unilaterally. Advertising is inherently a sub-optimal condition for both players: marketers would prefer to win consumers without spending money on advertising, and consumers would prefer to enjoy content without being advertised to. The concept of the Prisoner’s Dilemma illuminates this condition, because it suggests that consumers and marketers could reach a more satisfying relationship if they could coordinate cooperation. Studies conducted on iterative rounds of the Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrate this natural evolution toward cooperation and reveal a set of conditions that make cooperation possible, but they also demonstrate the fragility of cooperation and the potential for downward spirals of mutual defection.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Anderson, 2010. "The Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Emergence of Cooperation," Springer Books, in: Social Media Marketing, chapter 0, pages 35-52, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-13299-5_3
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13299-5_3
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