IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/sprchp/978-3-540-69305-5_20.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering

In: Handbook of New Institutional Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Victor P. Goldberg

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

The primary purpose of contract lawis, mostwould concede, to facilitate private ordering. The parties are the best judges of their interests and the law should, as much as possible, stay out of the way. There are exceptions–there might turn out to be good reasons to discourage, or prohibit, certain classes of promises (for example, disclaimers or promises to commit illegal acts) or to be suspicious of the manner in which agreements have been reached (for example, the battle of the forms or duress). Still, the facilitation of voluntary exchange remains the primary goal of contract law. Voluntary exchange is not a zero-sum game; it allows parties to achieve gains from trade. The parties enter into their agreement because they each expect to be better off. They might, of course, turn out to be wrong. It might have seemed a good idea at the time, but conditions might have changed so that one party now regretted having entered into the agreement. Or, one party might simply have misperceived the possible outcome. Had it known more (or been a more intelligent processor of available information), it would not have entered into the deal. Regardless, the basic presumption that there are gains from trade is the economic foundation for a facilitative law of contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Victor P. Goldberg, 2008. "The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 19, pages 491-511, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-69305-5_20
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-69305-5_20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.