Reputational Ethics

This lecture focuses on the distinctive challenges of ethical competition. Against the claim that ethical excellence is negated if it is conjoined with concern for reputation, I will claim that it is ethically acceptable if not noble to wish to be distinctively good at ethics (and relatedly at religion) and to strive to be recognized as such, just as it is fine to wish to be distinctively good at art, science, or intellectual endeavor in general, and to strive to be respected for being so. I argue that the domain of ethics is distinctive because of the universality of the obligation to participate in ethics games with other people, which contrasts with the elective quality of capitalist, political, scientistic, artistic, and academic games in adult life. The universality of ethics games, I will suggest, supports a Tocquevillian form of reputational ethics (self-interest rightly understood, or SIRU) that is more tilted toward the average person and less star-oriented than prevalent forms of business ethics, political ethics, and cultural ethics are. As in the preceding lectures, I reflect on my own actions and inactions, focusing on my past, present, and potential future involvement in religion.