Introduction: The Confusion About Happiness

Happiness is defined as the enduring appreciation of life as a whole. Happiness is not about some specific domain or aspect of life, it is not about some perfect state and it is not the same as utility. Individuals may adopt very different standards, and theoretically, this can lead to incomparability of happiness of different individuals. People may also adopt egocentric or immoral standards. Happiness is dualistic because it depends on two components: the affective and cognitive component. These components have their own dynamics, and it is not self-evident whether these components produce something new that may be denoted as happiness ‘in general’ or ‘overall happiness’, or ‘encompassing happiness’. Happiness is a specific type of subjective well-being, and confusion about happiness has a negative impact on our deliberations about our personal well-being and well-being in general. The confusion is also an obstacle for the acceptance of happiness as a standard in our personal and political deliberations. The first ambition of this book is to reduce confusion about happiness. After this reduction some arguments to accept or reject happiness as a standard are summarized in a value-free way. Happiness can be accepted as just a descriptive standard or as a standard to be pursued, but both options are based on the assumption that happiness is acceptable as a value. The arguments suggest that we may accept happiness at least as a descriptive standard, and possibly as a standard to be pursued in specific situations. But the actual normative decisions to do so are personal or political by nature.