IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/sprchp/978-3-030-44823-3_10.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Mixed Strategies and Expected Utility

In: Scissors and Rock

Author

Listed:
  • Manfred J. Holler

    (University of Hamburg)

  • Barbara Klose-Ullmann

    (Center of Conflict Resolution)

Abstract

The analysis ofStrategymixed-mixed-strategyMixed strategyNash equilibrium,Nash equilibrium offered in this chapter, builds on the concept of expected utilityUtilityexpected-—which has been challenged by Allais, Kahneman-Tversky, and numerous experimental results. Here, it is applied as a theoretical tool to discuss the peculiarities of the Nash equilibriumNash equilibrium when it is mixed as, e.g., in the Inspection Game.Inspection Game It is demonstrated that in the Nash equilibriumNash equilibrium the strategy of player 1 is exclusively determined by the payoffs of player 2, and vice versa. Moreover, if the Maximin SolutionMaximin Solution of this game is in mixed strategiesMixed strategy as well, then its payoffs are identical to the payoffs of the Nash equilibrium.Nash equilibrium In general, however, the prescribed strategies are different because in the Maximin SolutionMaximin Solution the strategy of player i depends exclusively on the payoffs of i. Arthur Miller’s “The Crucible,” the Stag Hunt Game,Stag Hunt Game and Peter Handke’sHandke, Peter “The Goalie’s AnxietyGoalie’s Anxiety at the Penalty Kick” illustrate the results of this chapter.

Suggested Citation

  • Manfred J. Holler & Barbara Klose-Ullmann, 2020. "Mixed Strategies and Expected Utility," Springer Books, in: Scissors and Rock, chapter 0, pages 165-194, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-44823-3_10
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-44823-3_10
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-44823-3_10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.