The Color Revolutions. Successes and Limitations of Non-violent Protest

For several years in the first decade of the twenty-first century, roughly 2003–2005, many in the West believed that freedom was advancing and that the promise of post-Soviet democracy could be achieved. Today that seems like a quaint, or maybe delusional, vision, but at the time it was very real, at least from the perspective of Washington. The reason for this hope for democracy was a series of events in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan known as the Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions. The Bulldozer Revolution had occurred in Serbia and was a relevant model for these three countries. Collectively, these developments came to be referred to as the Color Revolutions. Despite their aim of achieving democracy in post-Soviet states, the realities of these political transformations were much more mixed, and often disappointing. Mitchell points out that the Color Revolutions were not cases of dictatorships being overthrown by massive people’s movements. They are, less dramatically, better understood as semi-democratic governments that became increasingly corrupt and weak over time, being ousted by mostly peaceful demonstrators to bring in alternative leaders who had at one time been part of the regime. One key component of the Color Revolution model was the role that youth movements allegedly played in the Color Revolutions. The author concludes that the Color Revolutions produced chronic instability, as their democratic advances were followed by backsliding to illiberal and corrupt regimes, which led to further protests and political upheavals. There are some concrete lessons that can be gleaned from reflecting on the Color Revolutions. The term revolution suggests a sharp break with the past, but in all three of these countries, the ideas of continuity and cycles may be a better way to understand these events and the years surrounding them. In all three cases, the Color Revolutions were part of cycles of regime formation and collapse.