Distributive Information Justice (And Its Limits)

In this chapter, I seek to go beyond contemporary theories of information privacy by subjective the standard information flow models to analysis from the perspective of justice. I examine two perspectives. At the least, one can see privacy as connected to justice instrumentally, that is, privacy is valuable not as a requirement of justice directly but because it is a useful means of justice. This is, I argue, hardly adequate as an entire theory of information justice but it is too easily given short shrift in discussions of privacy (especially by the wealthiest Silicon Valley titans who can protect their interests more directly). A more robust approach looks to theories of distributive justice. Theories of distribution that focus on the distributive process can address two significant weaknesses in information flow models of privacy, weak conceptions of informed consent and the inability to address the original acquisition of information. Pattern theories of distributive justice shift the focus from distributing information to distributing privacy rights, and provide significant insight into what it means to have rights to be left alone or forgotten. Each of these theories makes useful contributions to our understanding or privacy. But they are not wholly adequate to the task; for this, one needs to understand justice structurally as well as distributively.