IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/oprchp/978-3-540-77903-2_24.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Greedy Heuristics and Weight-Coded EAs for Multidimensional Knapsack Problems and Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions

In: Operations Research Proceedings 2007

Author

Listed:
  • Jella Pfeiffer

    (University Mainz)

  • Franz Rothlauf

    (University Mainz)

Abstract

The multidimensional knapsack problem (MDKP) is a generalized variant of the $$ \mathcal{N}\mathcal{P} $$ -complete knapsack problem (KP). The MDKP assumes one knapsack being packed with a number of items x j so that the total profit Σpj of the selected items is maximized. In contrast to the standard KP, each item has m different properties (dimensions) r ij (i = 1, ...,m; j = 1, ..., n) consuming c i of the knapsack: 1 $$ maximize{\text{ }}\sum\limits_{j{\text{ = 1}}}^n {p_j x_j } $$ 2 $$ \begin{gathered} subject\ to \sum\limits_{j = 1}^n {r_{ij} x_j} \leqslant c_i ,i = 1,...,m \\ with\; x_j \in \{0,1\} ,j = 1,...,n, p_j ,c_i \in \mathbb{N}, r_{ij} \in \mathbb{N}_0 \end{gathered} $$ A number of relevant real-world problems can be modelled as MDKPs such as allocation problems, logistics problems, or cutting stock problems [6]. Recently [4], it has been noticed that also the winner determination problem (WDP) in the context of multi-unit combinatorial auctions (MUCA) can be modelled as MDKP. MUCAs are combinatorial auctions (CA) where multiple copies of each good are available. In CAs, bidding is allowed on bundles of goods, which allows bidders to express synergies between those goods they want to obtain. First, the agents submit their bids and then, the auctioneer allocates the goods to the agents so that his revenue is maximized. The revenue is the sum of all submitted bids which are accepted by the auctioneer. This allocation problem is called the WDP1.

Suggested Citation

  • Jella Pfeiffer & Franz Rothlauf, 2008. "Greedy Heuristics and Weight-Coded EAs for Multidimensional Knapsack Problems and Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions," Operations Research Proceedings, in: Jörg Kalcsics & Stefan Nickel (ed.), Operations Research Proceedings 2007, pages 153-158, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-540-77903-2_24
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-77903-2_24
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-540-77903-2_24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.