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Blind Multi-stage Scoring Auctions with Two-Sided Incomplete Information for Government Procurement

In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Industrial Logistics (ICIL) 2025

Author

Listed:
  • Jad Soucar

    (Daniel J. Epstein Department of Industrial & Systems Engineering, University of Southern California)

Abstract

Competitive bidding is the dominant mechanism through which the government allocates billions of dollars worth of assets every year. The approach is rooted in basic auction theory which would imply that a competitive bidding process can help reduce costs and guarantee the government favorable terms. In the case of government procurement the types of auctions a government agency can employ are strictly codified and regulated, however there are certain auction styles employed by governments where subjective scoring still appears.

Suggested Citation

  • Jad Soucar, 2026. "Blind Multi-stage Scoring Auctions with Two-Sided Incomplete Information for Government Procurement," Lecture Notes in Operations Research, in: U. Aytun Ozturk & Petri T. Helo (ed.), Proceedings of the International Conference on Industrial Logistics (ICIL) 2025, pages 241-252, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:lnopch:978-3-032-14489-8_25
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-14489-8_25
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