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How to Use Private Information in a Multi-person Zero-sum Game

In: Developments on Experimental Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Hiroyasu Yoneda

    (Kyoto Sangyo University)

  • Gen Masumoto

    (Kyoto Sangyo University)

  • Sobei H. Oda

    (Kyoto Sangyo University)

Abstract

This paper describes how people play a zero sum game with different private information. Apparently more informed players earn more than less informed players do. What happens however if people buy and sell speculatively in the future market? Those who are better informed seem to have greater chance to earn money, while those who have no information may expect zero profit because they seem to have equal chance to make money (to buy a commodity whose price will increase or to sell a commodity whose price will decrease) and to lose money (to sell a commodity whose price will increase or to buy a commodity whose price will decrease). Yet the sum of all traders is zero. If the most informed player earns profit and the lest informed player expects zero profit, some modestly informed players must suffer loss.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroyasu Yoneda & Gen Masumoto & Sobei H. Oda, 2007. "How to Use Private Information in a Multi-person Zero-sum Game," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Sobei Hidenori Oda (ed.), Developments on Experimental Economics, pages 239-244, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-68660-6_26
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68660-6_26
    as

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