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Collective Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching

In: Artificial Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Tomoko Fuku
  • Akira Namatame

    (National Defense Academy, Yokosuka)

  • Taisei Kaizouji

    (International Christian University)

Abstract

Summary Gale and Shapley originally proposed the two-sided matching algorithm, Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA). This is very brilliant method, but it has a demerit which produces. That is if men propose, it produces stable matching which is the best for men and the worst for women, and vise versa. In this paper, we propose a new algorithm with compromise that produce the balanced matching which are almost optimal for both sides. It is an important issue how far agents seek their own interests in a competitive environment. There are overwhelming evidences that support peoples are also motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. We will show that compromise which is individually irrational improves the welfare of the whole groups. The reasonable compromise level is obtained as the function of the size of the group so that the social utility should be maximized. We also obtain large-scale properties of the proposed algorithm.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomoko Fuku & Akira Namatame & Taisei Kaizouji, 2006. "Collective Efficiency in Two-Sided Matching," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: M. Beckmann & H. P. Künzi & G. Fandel & W. Trockel & A. Basile & A. Drexl & H. Dawid & K. Inderfurth (ed.), Artificial Economics, pages 115-126, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-28547-2_10
    DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28547-4_10
    as

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