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On the Effects of an Increase in the Number of Abaters in Pollution Abatement Games

Author

Listed:
  • Luca Colombo

    (Rennes School of Business)

  • Paola Labrecciosa

    (ESSCA School of Management (Paris Campus))

Abstract

We study the effects of an increase in the number of abaters in pollution abatement games, first in a static, then in a dynamic (continuous-time) game. In both games, we assume that m countries/agents agree on taking action to reduce the stock of pollution, which is a public bad, whereas n − m $$n-m$$ countries free ride on the abatement levels of the abaters. Moreover, we assume that abaters can either coordinate on their contributions or not. In the static game, both in the coordination and the non-coordination scenario, an increase in m leads to a decrease in the stock of pollution and to an increase in social welfare. In the dynamic game, instead, both in the coordination and the non-coordination scenario, an increase in m may result in a higher steady-state stock of pollution and a lower social welfare, depending on the “business-as-usual” level of output.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Colombo & Paola Labrecciosa, 2025. "On the Effects of an Increase in the Number of Abaters in Pollution Abatement Games," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science,, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-031-88638-6_10
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-88638-6_10
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differential games; Pollution abatement; Mode of cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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