IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/isochp/978-3-030-19107-8_11.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game

In: Games in Management Science

Author

Listed:
  • Javier Frutos

    (Universidad de Valladolid)

  • Guiomar Martín-Herrán

    (Universidad de Valladolid)

Abstract

In this paper we apply non-linear incentive strategies to sustain over time an agreement. We illustrate the use of these strategies in a linear-quadratic transboundary pollution differential game. The incentive strategies are constructed in such a way that in the long run the pollution stock (the state variable) is close to the steady state of the pollution stock under the cooperative mode of play. The non-linear incentive functions depend on the emission rates (control variables) of both players and on the current value of the pollution stock. The credibility of the incentive equilibrium strategies is analyzed and the performance of open-loop and feedback incentive strategies is compared in their role of helping to sustain an agreement over time. We present numerical experiments to illustrate the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Javier Frutos & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2020. "Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Pierre-Olivier Pineau & Simon Sigué & Sihem Taboubi (ed.), Games in Management Science, pages 187-204, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-19107-8_11
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-030-19107-8_11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.