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Hobbesian and Contractarian Constitutions

In: Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S

Author

Listed:
  • Geoffrey Brennan

    (ANU College of Arts and Social Sciences, The Australian National University
    UNC-Chapel Hill
    Duke University)

  • Giuseppe Eusepi

    (Sapienza University of Rome)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to summarise the standard ‘Constitutional political economy’ approach to fiscal constitutions, focusing on the circumstances in which explicitly fiscal restrictions will be called for, and directing attention to the key concerns and attributes of the standard approach—specifically, the contractarian normative framework and the emphasis on feasibility. That standard approach is then contrasted with an explicitly “Hobbesian” approach, where the feasibility of constitutional contract itself is a matter of contention and where for that reason there are limits to the application of standard contractarian notions. It is arguably more useful within the Hobbesian frame to conceive the constitution as a form of covenant, for which the appropriate analytic framework is the ‘trust’ game rather than exchange as such.

Suggested Citation

  • Geoffrey Brennan & Giuseppe Eusepi, 2016. "Hobbesian and Contractarian Constitutions," The European Heritage in Economics and the Social Sciences, in: Alain Marciano & Giovanni Battista Ramello (ed.), Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S, pages 55-73, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:euhchp:978-3-319-47471-7_4
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-47471-7_4
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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Eusepi, 2012. "From The Calculus of Consent to The Calculus of Dissent: a personal promenade in the constitutional square," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 279-283, September.

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