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Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign

In: Dynamic Games in Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Luca Lambertini

    (Università di Bologna
    University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

This chapter proposes a differential game describing electoral campaigns where two candidates invest so as to increase the number of their respective voters. It is shown that parties overinvest as compared to the social optimum, while the total number of votes may be larger or lower than the first best one, depending on the level of negative externalities affecting the campaign. The model is also extended to allow for n candidates, so as to derive the socially optimal number of candidates. It appears that the number of candidates maximising the total number of votes on the election day is lower than the number of candidates entering the political game attracted by any non-negative share of consensus.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Lambertini, 2014. "Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign," Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, in: Josef Haunschmied & Vladimir M. Veliov & Stefan Wrzaczek (ed.), Dynamic Games in Economics, edition 127, pages 187-204, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dymchp:978-3-642-54248-0_9
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-54248-0_9
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    Cited by:

    1. Fouad El Ouardighi & Eugene Khmelnitsky & Suresh P. Sethi, 2022. "Epidemic control with endogenous treatment capability under popular discontent and social fatigue," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(4), pages 1734-1752, April.
    2. Ganesh Manjhi & Meeta Keswani Mehra, 2019. "A Dynamic Analysis of Special Interest Politics and Electoral Competition," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 142-164, March.
    3. Manjhi, Ganesh & Mehra, Meeta Keswani, 2017. "Dynamics of the Economics of Special Interest Politics," Working Papers 17/206, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.

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