Research on the Evolutionary Game and Dynamic Equilibrium of Service Standards of Online Ride-Hailing Platforms Driven by User Complaints

The game relationship between service standards of ride-hailing platforms and user complaints profoundly impacts the sustainable development of the industry. This paper constructs a duopoly evolutionary game model to analyze the interaction mechanism between service standards and user complaints, and explores the impact of key variables on equilibrium through numerical simulation. The findings reveal that when the industry benchmark falls below user expectations, high-standard services form a "cost savings-repurchase growth" cycle by reducing complaint rates, with their effect modulated by user rights-awareness and platform response efficiency. Under the user "voting with their feet" mechanism, high-quality sensitivity and efficient complaint handling can suppress the "bad money drives out good money" phenomenon. The dynamic parameter adjustment model can identify the inflection point of marginal returns from service investment, optimizing the equilibrium path. The study provides a basis for constructing a service quality internal control system driven by user feedback, and suggests guiding high-quality equilibrium through differentiated pricing and transparent regulation.