IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/advbcp/978-94-6463-770-0_57.html

Executive Compensation Incentives, Analyst Attention, and Firms’ Investment in Innovation

In: Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2025)

Author

Listed:
  • Jia Xu

    (Sichuan Agricultural University, Business and Tourism School)

  • Chenying Zhao

    (Sichuan Agricultural University, Business and Tourism School)

Abstract

Innovation investment is key to high-quality corporate development and should be central to business strategy. Executive compensation incentives not only shape resource allocation but also critically influence innovation efforts. Additionally, analysts, as vital sources of market intelligence, offer oversight and guidance to business decisions. This study examines A-share listed companies to assess how executive pay incentives affect innovation investments and explores the moderating role of analyst attention. The results indicate that higher executive incentives lead to increased innovation investment, an effect that is even stronger under heightened analyst scrutiny. Robustness tests confirm these findings, offering valuable insights for refining compensation policies and shaping innovation strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Jia Xu & Chenying Zhao, 2025. "Executive Compensation Incentives, Analyst Attention, and Firms’ Investment in Innovation," Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, in: Wenke Zang & Chunping Xia (ed.), Proceedings of the 2025 3rd International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2025), pages 507-513, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:advbcp:978-94-6463-770-0_57
    DOI: 10.2991/978-94-6463-770-0_57
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:advbcp:978-94-6463-770-0_57. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.