How to Motivate Car Companies to Cooperate under the Dual Credit Policy: An Evolutionary Game Analysis Considering Consumer Sensitivity

The promotion and development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is regarded as a pivotal measure in achieving a low-carbon transition in the transportation sector. In China, the dual-credit policy, an innovative incentive mechanism, is gradually replacing purchase subsidies. Through a credit trading mechanism, it encourages traditional energy vehicle corporations to reduce emissions and promotes industry transformation. This study constructs an evolutionary game model based on the Hotelling model to analyze the impacts of consumer sensitivity, collaborative innovation costs, and the dual-credit policy on automakers’ willingness to pursue collaborative innovation. Simulation results indicate that when consumers have high demands for NEV range, NEV companies are more inclined towards independent research and development. In contrast, traditional energy vehicle corporations are more likely to adopt collaborative innovation strategies when fuel efficiency is prioritized. The increase in additive and multiplicative coefficients of the policy enhances cooperative intent. The findings suggest that the government should optimize credit calculations, increase subsidies for collaborative innovation, and rationally guide consumer demand to foster sustainable development in the automotive industry.