Coordination of New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Considering Quality Improvement under the Dual-Credit Policy

Aiming at the higher requirements on product quality imposed by the dual-credit policy, this study takes the two-level supply chain system composed of a single battery supplier and a single new energy vehicle manufacturer as the object of study. On the basis of comprehensively considering the impact of factors such as point price, quality effort level and consumer preference on supply chain profits, this study uses game theory methods to construct supply chain decision-making models of centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and coordination contracts. And the coordinated effect of the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract is investigated through numerical analysis. The study findings indicate that as the price of credits grows, both the cost-sharing and benefit-sharing ratios also increase. Additionally, the suppliers’ degree of quality effort increases, but the selling price of NEV falls. The manufacturer implements the cost-sharing contract when the quality cost coefficient falls within a specific range. When the coefficient for the cost of quality is high, both coordination mechanisms can accomplish Pareto improvement. However, the gain-sharing contract is superior in terms of enhancing the supplier’s product quality level and overall profitability of the supply chain.