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A Study on Antitrust Regulation of Platform Economy Based on Evolutionary Game

In: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Financial Innovation and Economic Development (ICFIED 2024)

Author

Listed:
  • Meijiao Zhang

    (Harbin University of Commerce, School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the selection and evolution process of game strategies by constructing an imperfectly rational government, platform enterprises and practitioners as a model of a three-party evolutionary game, and analyzes the conditions for reaching the optimal evolutionary steady state using numerical simulations. The path of China’s antitrust transformation in the context of the Internet platform economy is studied, and the influence of different antitrust actors on antitrust behavior is quantitatively evaluated, while the key factors of the path of national policy promotion are pointed out. The results show that in the context of the platform economy, the cost of government and the punishment for corporate violations play a key role in the efficiency of antitrust policy implementation. The advancement of antitrust behavior in the platform economy is more beneficial when the cost of government regulation is smaller and the punishment for violating enterprises is stronger.

Suggested Citation

  • Meijiao Zhang, 2024. "A Study on Antitrust Regulation of Platform Economy Based on Evolutionary Game," Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research, in: Khaled Elbagory & Zefu Wu & Hamdan Amer Ali Al-Jaifi & Shafie Mohamed Zabri (ed.), Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Financial Innovation and Economic Development (ICFIED 2024), pages 153-163, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:advbcp:978-94-6463-408-2_18
    DOI: 10.2991/978-94-6463-408-2_18
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