Research on Market Game Dynamics in Low-Altitude Logistics under Subsidy Strategies

The logistics industry is being significantly transformed by the sustained growth of the low-altitude economy; however, how the government can effectively strengthen its regulatory role in the low-altitude logistics market remains a pressing issue. This paper investigates the interaction mechanisms among low-altitude logistics enterprises, the government, and consumers using a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze payoff variations and equilibrium conditions under different strategy combinations. The results indicate that: an optimal interval exists for subsidy intensity, and a graduated phase-out mechanism should be adopted to achieve efficient resource allocation; penalty instruments require differentiated design to balance regulatory constraints with innovation incentives; policy resources should prioritize enterprise R&D to leverage technological innovation for demand stimulation; and the government should concentrate its efforts during the critical early window of industrial development, facilitating the market’s breakthrough past the tipping point before orderly withdrawal, thereby establishing a scientifically efficient governance model.