Research on Coordinated Return and Pricing Decisions in a Fresh Produce Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Consumers’ Strategic Stockpiling and Freshness-Keeping Effort

Amid global economic volatility, fresh produce dual-channel supply chains face challenges from consumers’ strategic stockpiling and return behaviors, alongside suppliers’ freshness-keeping and retailers’ service efforts. Existing studies rarely integrate all factors. This paper constructs a game-theoretic model incorporating stockpiling and returns, deriving demand and return functions. A two-period dynamic game analyzes decentralized decisions and two return-cost modes. A composite contract (revenue sharing, return-cost sharing, freshness-keeping cost sharing) achieves coordination.1 Key findings: stockpiling shifts demand from Period 2 to Period 1; decentralized decisions cause efficiency losses; optimal return-cost mode depends on channel preference and freshness sensitivity; the composite contract enables perfect coordination; freshness sensitivity drives effort and pricing, while stronger stockpiling amplifies Period 1 demand but contracts Period 2 demand. This study supports fresh produce enterprises under uncertainty.