Research on Pricing Strategy of Online Freight Platform Considering User Behavior

In recent years, with the development of network freight transportation platforms, the platforms have gradually shifted from a subsidized model to a high commission model, resulting in a general “order jumping” (direct transactions off the platform) by shippers and drivers in search of higher returns. This not only affects the sustainable operation of the platform, but also reduces the overall matching efficiency of the market and social welfare. This paper analyzes the equilibrium state of the platform under the commision pricing strategy by constructing a game model that takes into account the users’ jumping order behavior, focusing on the impact of jumping cost and risk on users’ behavior, platform pricing and social welfare. It is found that the platform’s equilibrium commission percentage is positively related to users’ jumping order efforts and risk costs, i.e., market imperfections instead enhance the platform’s bargaining power, allowing it to convert transaction frictions into profits. Although the increase in the difficulty of jumping will inhibit some users’ behavior, the increase in the platform’s commission in turn incentivizes the motivation of jumping, creating the dilemma of “the more you prevent, the more you jump”. In addition, social welfare varies in a U-shape with the cost of jumping, suggesting that either too high or too low a cost is detrimental to the overall efficiency of the market.