Research on Government’s Piracy Regulation Measures and Innovation Incentive Strategies from the Perspective of Consumers’ Internal and External Preferences in the Digital Economy

Against the backdrop of the digital economy, the issue of information product piracy has become increasingly complex due to technological empowerment, seriously undermining the legitimate rights and interests of legitimate platforms and their enthusiasm for innovation. This study constructs a game model involving the government, legitimate platforms, pirate platforms, and heterogeneous consumers, incorporating Salience Theory and network externalities. Four policy combinations are designed: Weak Regulation + No Incentive (WN), Weak Regulation + Incentive (WI), Strong Regulation + No Incentive (SN), and Strong Regulation + Incentive (SI). The research systematically analyzes the impact mechanisms of platform quality innovation level, penalty intensity, consumers’ salience thinking degree, and the strength of network externalities. This paper provides a systematic solution for digital platform piracy governance featuring “quality innovation as the core, policy combinations as the means, and demand-side guidance as the supplement.”