Optimizing China’s College Entrance Examination: Integrating Deferred Acceptance Principles into the Parallel Volunteer System and theoretical extensions---Evidence from Zhejiang Province

The College Entrance Examination (Gaokao) is pivotal in China’s education system, with its Parallel Voluntary System (PVS) representing a significant admission mechanism in this system. However, while improving the flexibility of choices and reducing high-score student rejection risks compared to sequential systems, the PVS still faces some persistent challenges, such as strategic manipulation by applicants, residual efficiency loss, and stability issues. This study proposes a theoretical framework by systematically comparing the PVS with the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm, an essential mechanism in market design, which perfectly balanced the Pareto efficiency and the stability of the system. Through a systematic analysis of their core mechanisms (information structure, matching process, agent roles), expected goals (fairness, efficiency, stability), and operational feasibility, we identify critical limitations in the current PVS framework and attempt to explore practical methods to improve the Gaokao admission system. This study will introduce some potential hybrid solutions inspired by DA principles, such as integrating a “proposal-tentative acceptance” stage in the PVS to enhance information transparency and preference guidance to encourage truthful preference revelation and reducing rejection risks through “tentative hold” statuses in DA mechanisms. The findings would demonstrate the significant theoretical and practical value of DA mechanisms in balancing the fairness, efficiency, and stability of higher education admissions in China.