The Framing of Discipline

The negotiated order of the modern industrial state is based on “incomplete” antagonisms. Antagonisms remain incomplete when those who constitute the negotiated order know that they will meet again tomorrow. Curiously enough, more often than not the preservation of the architecture of social order appears to be the result of the transitory rationalizations of its architects. As shown in the preceding chapter, order may be reinforced by rationales that are meant to be a temporary or situational answer to the sordid sides of the status quo. The results may be uncomfortable though. Labor unions, for instance, looking for official recognition in a tripartite neo-corporatist consortium and eager to demonstrate their reliability as a partner by disciplining their constituencies may accomplish something that in the long run appears to be contrary to their effectiveness and survival. The same applies to rival firms and rival states that for reasons of short-term opportunism decide to cooperate — be it primarily in the copycat mode, that is as a defense against the collaborative maneuvers of their rivals. The shared “transitory” inspiration in these cases is that the penalty for symmetric non-cooperation is perceived to be worse than the penalty for “temporary” asymmetric cooperation. The result may be ultra stable, in hindsight possibly to the regret of some of the architects of that negotiated order.