Three Visions of Liberty: John Stuart Mill, Isaiah Berlin, Quentin Skinner

In this chapter, I wish to examine John Stuart Mill’s concept of liberty as it emerges especially from On Liberty (1859) in the light of Isaiah Berlin’s and Quentin Skinner’s interpretations. Mill’s view of liberty as absence of constraints in self-regarding actions has been hailed by Berlin as the quintessential notion of “negative liberty” (an expression originally coined by Samuel Pufendorf and then used by Jeremy Bentham).1 On the other hand, Skinner has emphasized Mill’s belief that a minimum level of interference from the government, together with a maximum of social tolerance, was needed to promote “individuality” and “eccentricity"; in this respect Mill’s view of liberty cannot be described as merely negative for it has a positive goal. After examining the respective merits of their interpretations, I conclude that both Berlin and Skinner had a political agenda in their interpretation of Mill which was dictated by the practical circumstances as well as by their different interpretative sensibilities. What emerges clearly from this comparison and study in reception is the complexity and comprehensiveness of Mill’s notion of liberty, which cannot be easily pinpointed and hastily attributed to a political or philosophical camp: according to the aspects of his thought emphasized by the authors, Mill’s concept of liberty can be characterized either as “negative” or as “positive.”