A Note on Menger’s Problem Situation and Non-essentialist Approach to Economics

Philosophical interpretations of Menger’s approach to economics can be divided into two groups: one considering his approach from a more ‘technical’ point of view; and one considering possible philosophical influences on his position. Authors belonging to the first group consider questions such as whether Menger regards inductivist or deductivist techniques as primarily appropriate for economics (Schmoller, 1883; Keynes, 1891; Kerschagl, 1925). Authors belonging to the second group try to establish the influence of specific philosophical theories upon Menger’s economic theories and methodological positions. They suggest that Menger’s economic theories and methodological positions reflect influences of the philosophy of Kant (Dobretsberger, 1949) or opine that they reflect principles of rationalism and intellectualism, such as represented by the philosophy of Wolf (Boos, 1986). But the most prominent group among those interpretations asserts that Menger defends an Aristotelian essentialist position. It also seems that this interpretation has become a kind of standard interpretation of his economic, philosophical and epistemological positions (Kauder, 1958, 1962; Hutchison, 1973; Alter, 1990; Smith, 1990; Campagnolo, 2008).