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Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game: The Walrasian Fixed-Supply Conjecture Model, Contest-Nash Equilibrium, and the Invariance Principle

In: The Comparative Economics of Sport

Author

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  • Stefan Szymanski

    (Imperial College London)

Abstract

This chapter explores the standard 2-team model of talent choice in a professional sports league and argues that the application of Nash concepts leads to a different equilibrium than that which is normally identified. In particular, it is shown that the invariance principle for gate-revenue sharing no longer holds. Because the standard model, which is here called the Walrasian fixed-supply conjecture model, is widely taught in sports management and economics programs, these finding have important implications for teachers as well as researchers.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Szymanski, 2010. "Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game: The Walrasian Fixed-Supply Conjecture Model, Contest-Nash Equilibrium, and the Invariance Principle," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Comparative Economics of Sport, chapter 8, pages 244-261, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-27427-3_8
    DOI: 10.1057/9780230274273_8
    as

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