illicit drugs, retail market
Three key features of the retail trade for illicit drugs are documented: moral hazard, repeated interactions and price dispersion. An interpretation of this evidence based on search and informational frictions is presented. Various policy implications of the suggested interpretation are discussed.
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|This chapter was published in: Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume (ed.) , , pages , 2010, 2nd quarter update.|
|This item is provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its series The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics with number v:4:year:2010:doi:3824.|
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