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marital institutions

  • Scott Drewianka
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    Marital institutions are rules governing marriages and divorces. Most work to date has focused on unilateral and no-fault divorce reforms. Theoretical discussions generally hinge on the applicability of the Coase theorem. Empirical evidence is mixed, but generally indicates that those reforms played only a modest or temporary role in generating trends in marriage, divorce and fertility. There is more consistent evidence of substantial effects on intrahousehold allocation and other distributional outcomes, especially in conjunction with rules on post-divorce division of property. Several new institutions that have emerged in recent years present promising opportunities for future research.

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    This chapter was published in: Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume (ed.) , , pages , 2010, 1st quarter update.
    This item is provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its series The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics with number v:4:year:2010:doi:1928.
    Handle: RePEc:pal:dofeco:v:4:year:2010:doi:1928
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/

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