Die Einführung von Kapitalverkehrskontrollen mit Korruptionsabsichten
In: List Forum Band 33
Capital controls are one of the most widespread regulations worldwide. This is surprising in so far, as capital controls are a policy, which economists reject almost unanimously except for the case of least developed countries with barely developed financial markets. The question arises, what causes the popularity of a policy, which is not first choice in generating government income, which is rejected by the majority of theoretical and empirical oriented economists. This paper presents the idea, that capital con-trols are actually introduced not to manage capital flow composition and not to generate government income but to generate income for politicians, i.e. that they are implemented in order to be ,abused'. This thesis is supported by the widespread use of controls, which include much leeway for discretionary decisions of bureaucrats. Such controls are abused more easily, although they are not even supported by staunch advocates of capital controls. (Original text only available in german language)
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