Bargeld-Seigniorage in der EWU - Hindernis für einen effizienten Zahlungsverkehr?
In: List Forum Band 30
In the European Monetary Union the seigniorage to the member countries is organized in a specific way. On the one hand, the seigniorage generated by the issue of Euro bills is profit of the European Central Bank that is distributed by a determined key. On the other hand, the member countries gain the seigniorage of Euro coinage directly. Due to this inconsistency a change in denomination (e.g. a substitution of Euro bills by Euro coins et vice versa) will cause redistribution effects among the member countries. This could hamper an adjustment of denomination being necessary due to efficiency reason. This paper analyzes and quantifies the redistribution effects considering a simulated substitution of 5 Euro bills by 5 Euro coins. (Original text only available in german language)
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