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Revisiting the Effect of Voter Isolation

In: Replication in Experimental Economics

Author

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  • Alexander G. James
  • Jason F. Shogren

Abstract

Does social-isolation deflate observed preferences for public goods? Using a voting referendum elicitation mechanism, List et al. (2004) document a 30% reduction in affirmative voting when votes are privately, rather than publicly, cast for a public good. We replicate this work and then add to the exercise by examining the role that group size plays in generating social-pressure bias – an extension we motivate with a structural model. Having replicated to the extent possible the List et al.’s consequential private and public treatments, we find that when group size is large (N = 60), social isolation reduces affirmative votes by roughly 30%, a result that does not carry over to the small-group (N = 30) session.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander G. James & Jason F. Shogren, 2015. "Revisiting the Effect of Voter Isolation," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Replication in Experimental Economics, volume 18, pages 137-152, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-230620150000018005
    DOI: 10.1108/S0193-230620150000018005
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2017. "Referenda Under Oath," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 479-504, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting referendum; social isolation; preference revelation; C9; H4; Q5;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

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