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The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments

In: Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors

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  • Matthew A. Halloran
  • James M. Walker
  • Arlington W. Williams

Abstract

This paper examines binding multi-round commitments (MRCs) to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM) game. Before each five-round interval, subjects in a four-person group are given the option to commit a portion of their endowments to the group account for each of the next five rounds. Decision rounds proceed, with each subject's commitment acting as the binding minimum of his group-account allocation for each round. The opportunity to make MRCs does not increase mean allocations to the group account relative to a control treatment. However, commitments do have implications for reciprocal behavior within groups, leading to higher outcome variances across groups in the MRCs treatment.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew A. Halloran & James M. Walker & Arlington W. Williams, 2006. "The voluntary provision of a public good with binding multi-round commitments," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments Investigating Fundraising and Charitable Contributors, pages 225-246, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:rexezz:s0193-2306(06)11009-1
    DOI: 10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11009-1
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