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Democratic Institutions and Corruption: Incentives and Constraints in Politics

In: International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption

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  • Jana Kunicová

Abstract

Economic research on corruption aims both to isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties, and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb harms and enhance benefits. In this comprehensive Handbook, top scholars in the field provide specially commissioned essays, both theoretical and empirical, exploring both types of research.

Suggested Citation

  • Jana Kunicová, 2006. "Democratic Institutions and Corruption: Incentives and Constraints in Politics," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3740_5
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    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Law - Academic;

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