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Introduction

In: Handbook of Research on Complexity

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  • J. Barkley Rosser

Abstract

Complexity research draws on complexity in various disciplines. This Handbook provides a comprehensive and current overview of applications of complexity theory in economics. The 15 chapters, written by leading figures in the field, cover such broad topic areas as conceptual issues, microeconomic market dynamics, aggregation and macroeconomics issues, econophysics and financial markets, international economic dynamics, evolutionary and ecological–environmental economics, and broader historical perspectives on economic complexity.

Suggested Citation

  • J. Barkley Rosser, 2009. "Introduction," Chapters,in: Handbook of Research on Complexity, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3625_1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Randall Holcombe, 1991. "Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, pages 303-328.
    3. Donald Boudreaux & A. Pritchard, 1994. "Reassessing the role of the independent judiciary in enforcing interest-group bargains," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, pages 1-21.
    4. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," NBER Working Papers 0110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Carsten Hefeker, 1995. "Monetary union or currency competition? Currency arrangements for monetary stability in East and West," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, pages 57-69.
    6. Buchanan, James M, 1993. "Public Choice after Socialism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 67-74, September.
    7. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Barry Eichengreen., 1993. "International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C93-021, University of California at Berkeley.
    9. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    10. Larry Merville & Dale Osborne, 1990. "Constitutional democracy and the theory of agency," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, pages 21-47.
    11. Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, 1986. "Constraining the Transfer Society: Constitutional and Moral Dimensions," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(1), pages 317-345, Spring/Su.
    12. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, November.
    13. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    14. Russell Sobel, 1994. "The League of Nations covenant and the United Nations charter: An analysis of two international constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, pages 173-192.
    15. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
    16. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    17. Backhaus J.G., 1995. "An economic analysis of constitutional law," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    18. Anton Lowenberg & Ben Yu, 1992. "Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of “exit”," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, pages 51-72.
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