A right of peoples and individuals to international solidarity? Analyzing its suitability, provenance, character and orientation

This chapter discusses the suitability of the proposed “right of individuals and peoples to international solidarity” as a human right. They argue that the “human right-ness” of a claim to that status has always been socio-politically contingent and has never been conceptually a given. Hence, they suggest that the criteria set by the current orthodoxy ought not by itself determine the fate of the proposed right’s claim to human right-ness. They argue that the proposed right is neither inherently unsuitable as a human right nor so excessively vague as to be disqualified. It is also not incapable of garnering widespread global acceptance. The chapter then shows that the proposed right can pass Alston’s procedural test for the control of the quality of candidates for the conferment of the status of rights. Lastly, the chapter argues that although the status of the proposed right is currently less certain than the fundamental principle of international law upon which it is grounded, it is not totally without roots in already existing international human rights law provisions (both at the global and regional levels). Moreover, they suggest that its proposed content is reasonably decipherable, and its right-holders and duty-bearers are easily identifiable.