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Red cards: (mis)carriage of justice?

In: A Modern Guide to Sports Economics

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  • Ruud H. Koning
  • Lara van Steen

Abstract

Recent research has shown considerable variation in the way referees enforce the rules of professional sporting contests. Dawson et al. (2007) show inconsistency of refereeing standards in English soccer. Even after conditioning on team and match specific variables, they find significant fixed referee effects. Garicano et al. (2005) show that professional soccer referees tend to add more stoppage time in case the home team benefits from that extra time, and that they shorten close games when the home team is ahead. In American basketball, more personal fouls are awarded against players when the referees are from an opposite race (Price and Wolfers, 2010). Judges tend to assess female gymnasts who perform later in a final better than earlier ones, even though the order of performance is randomized (Joustra et al., 2021). Buraimo et al. (2010) show that in the English Premier League (EPL) and German Bundesliga home teams are treated more favorably in that they receive fewer yellow and red cards. Even though sporting rules are supposed to be identical for all participants, they are not enforced identically for all participants. In this chapter, we add to this literature by examining specifically the direct red card in professional soccer. When a player is shown a red card in soccer, he has to leave the field, and his team is one man short for the remainder of the game. In this sense, it is an irreversible decision in soccer matches. Ridder et al. (1994) show that the team left with 11 players has a higher scoring intensity, both if playing at home and when it plays away. Hence, a team is put at a significant disadvantage when a player is sent off. In the judicial process that follows a direct (straight) red card, the decision is sometimes reversed: the player receives no punishment, and the card is dismissed (revoked or rescinded). In other words, the red card should not have been given, and the team has unjustifiably suffered from being one player short. In this chapter, we assess determinants of a direct red card, possible determinants of dismissal of a red card, and the consequences of these dismissals. Are lower-ranked teams more likely to receive red cards that are eventually rescinded? During the sample period that we cover, the Video Assistant Referee (VAR) was introduced. As a consequence, one would expect any bias to have disappeared and dismissals of direct red cards to have decreased.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruud H. Koning & Lara van Steen, 2021. "Red cards: (mis)carriage of justice?," Chapters, in: Ruud H. Koning & Stefan Kesenne (ed.), A Modern Guide to Sports Economics, chapter 18, pages 269-280, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:19238_18
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    Economics and Finance;

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