Canada Deposit Insurance: Moral Hazard and the Safety Net, and a Differential Premium System
This paper consists of two parts. Part I discusses the Canadian experience with moral hazard and deposit insurance. It takes a look at the benefits and costs of deposit insurance and the future policy issues in Canada with regard to the safety net and deposit insurance. Part II analyses the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation's Differential Premium System, including the system design and development, as well as the qualitative criteria and factors to review member institutions. Lastly, the paper also includes as an appendix, the other available approaches in developing a differential premium system.
|This book is provided by South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre in its series Occasional Papers with number occ29 and published in 1999.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 603-9195 1888
Fax: 603-9195 1801
Web page: http://edirc.repec.org/data/seacemy.html
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sea:opaper:occ29. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Yunyee)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.