Hackers at the Quantum Frontier: Geopolitics, the Quantum Arms Race, and the Stakes for Developing Economies

Quantum technology has moved from laboratory curiosity to instrument of statecraft. The United States, China, and the European Union have collectively committed tens of billions of dollars to quantum research programs, framing quantum advantage not merely as a scientific milestone but as a determinant of future economic and military power. Yet the discourse surrounding this 'quantum arms race' has been dominated by the perspectives of technologically advanced states, leaving a critical question unexamined: what happens to the rest of the world when the cryptographic foundations of the global digital economy are rewritten? This paper examines the quantum arms race through three interconnected lenses. First, it analyses the evolving threat landscape, in particular the 'harvest now, decrypt later' strategies already being deployed by state-sponsored and sophisticated criminal hacking groups. Encrypted data exfiltrated today, such as financial records, diplomatic communications, health data, and intellectual property, may be exposed retroactively once quantum computers capable of cryptanalysis become available. For adversaries, the quantum threat is not a future event; it is a present-day opportunity for collection. Drawing on threat intelligence research, we map how hacker communities and advanced persistent threat actors are adapting their tradecraft in anticipation of quantum capability, and how the boundary between state and non-state actors continues to blur. By connecting hacker behavior, geopolitical strategy, and development economics, this paper offers a holistic account of the quantum arms race, one that treats cybersecurity not as a purely technical discipline but as a question of global equity and resilience.