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Epistemic Game Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Perea,Andrés

Abstract

In everyday life we must often reach decisions while knowing that the outcome will not only depend on our own choice, but also on the choices of others. These situations are the focus of epistemic game theory. Unlike classical game theory, it explores how people may reason about their opponents before they make their final choice in a game. Packed with examples and practical problems based on stories from everyday life, this is the first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory. Each chapter is dedicated to one particular, natural way of reasoning. The book then shows how each of these ways of reasoning will affect the final choices that can rationally be made and how these choices can be found by iterative procedures. Moreover, it does so in a way that uses elementary mathematics and does not presuppose any previous knowledge of game theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Perea,Andrés, 2012. "Epistemic Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107401396.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9781107401396
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
    2. Tsakas Elias, 2012. "Pairwise Mutual Knowledge and Correlated Rationalizability," Research Memorandum 031, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Oikonomou, V.K. & Jost, J, 2013. "Periodic strategies and rationalizability in perfect information 2-Player strategic form games," MPRA Paper 48117, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Billot, Antoine & Vergnaud, Jean-Christophe & Walliser, Bernard, 2015. "Multiagent belief revision," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 47-57.
    5. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
    6. Tsakas Elias, 2012. "Rational belief hierarchies," Research Memorandum 004, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    7. Perea, Andrés, 2014. "Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 231-254.
    8. Tsakas, Elias, 2013. "Pairwise epistemic conditions for correlated rationalizability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 379-384.
    9. Barelli, Paulo & Galanis, Spyros, 2013. "Admissibility and event-rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 21-40.
    10. Tsakas, Elias, 2014. "Rational belief hierarchies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 121-127.
    11. Christian Bach & Andrés Perea, 2014. "Utility proportional beliefs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 881-902, November.
    12. repec:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:2:p:19-:d:94578 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-016-0535-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.

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